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Water did have a constructive right to provide water and sewer services
by virtue of the County's failure to comply with codified procedure for
denying the proposal, the right was not exclusive.
The court
elaborated that Williamsburg Water's service rights were not "superior
to the County's own right to decide who will provide water and sewer
services to its citizens" and admitted the unfortunate result of the
ruling was to deflate the commercial value of the rights possessed by
Williamsburg Water.
Next, the court held that it could not review the issue of whether
the trial court erred in failing to find that Williamsburg Water was
exempt from the County's franchise ordinance because an order
denying summary judgment could not be reviewed according to state
case law precedent. The court of appeals remanded this issue to the
trial court for further proceeding to determine applicability of the
franchise ordinance to Williamsburg Water.
Finally, on the issue of whether the County's conduct rose to the
level of gross negligence, the court concluded there was no evidence
in the record that the County intentionally sought to hamper
Williamsburg Water's ability to provide the proposed services. The
court instead indicated that it was evident the County proceeded to
extend its water and sewer services to the specified area based on the
misguided notion that it satisfied the notice provisions of local law
when it held public readings of the proposed ordinance. Because the
court held that this conduct was not an "intentional, conscious failure"
to perform a duty, it concluded that these circumstances immunized
the County from liability under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act
and affirmed the trial court.
Thus, the court's ruling was to affirm the decision of the trial court
and remanded the issue regarding the application of the franchise
ordinance. Two of the court judges concurred in the result, each
differing with the reasoning and analysis of the majority.
Brian M Forbush

TEXAS
Chocolate Bayou Water Co. v. Texas Natural Res. Conservation
Comm'n, 124 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a party
petitioning forjudicial review of a water right application must exhaust
all available administrative remedies before the court system acquires
jurisdiction).
Chocolate Bayou Water Company ("Chocolate Bayou") and Sand
Supply, both divisions of Campbell Concrete and Materials, L.P.,
appealed the decision of the District Court of Travis County granting a
plea to jurisdiction, and in the alternative summary judgment,
dismissing their suit contesting the validity of a reissued water right
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permit. In 1999, the Texas legislature required the Texas Commission
on Environmental Quality ("TCEQ"), formerly the Texas Natural
Resource Conservation Commission, to reissue the previously issued
but expressly abandoned Aliens Creek water right permit to the Texas
Water Development Board ("TWDB"). After the TWDB amended the
permit to change the type of use, the TCEQ issued the permit on
January 16, 2002. At the trial court, Chocolate Bayou and Sand Supply
claimed that defective notice provided by the amendment process
deprived any affected parties of an opportunity to timely request a
contested-case hearing with the TCEQ. The Court of Appeals of
Texas, Third District, Austin held the notice of the amended permit
provided to Chocolate Bayou and Sand Supply adequate and affirmed
the decision of the trial court.
The reissued Aliens Creek permit initially contained all of the
provisions of the original permit, including the intended use as a
cooling reservoir for a power plant, and required amendment to
change the purpose of the permit to supplying municipal water to the
The Texas legislature intended the permit
City of Houston.
amendment process to meet the notice and hearing requirements of
the Texas Water Code for issuing a diversion permit. TWBD filed an
application to amend the Aliens Creek permit in June 2003; the TQEC
mailed notice of the amended application to all potentially affected
senior water right holders.
Chocolate Bayou and Sand Supply both held water rights senior to
the reissued Allens Creek permit that the amended permit could have
adversely affected. However, neither requested a hearing with the
TCEQ to contest the amended Aliens Creek permit within the ;llotted
time frame. Both Chocolate Bayou and Sand Supply relied on
language in the notice to protect their rights even though a draft of
the amended application sent with the notice indicated potential harm
to those rights. The Texas Water Code only requires that notice of a
water right permit provide enough information to timely inform
senior water users of potential adverse effects on their interests.
Interested parties can obtain further details by viewing the final
application and any supporting materials available for inspection at
the TQEC. The final amended permit application allowed the TWDB
to divert waters at stream levels below stream flow restrictions placed
on both Chocolate Bayou's and Sand Supply's permits. The TQEC
denied Chocolate Bayou's and Sand Supply's motions for contestedcase hearings as untimely and issued the amended Aliens Creek
application as a water right permit early in 2002.
The court stated that the court system only had jurisdiction to
review actions of an administrative agency such as the TQEC only after
the petitioning party exercises all administrative remedies. The court
held that Chocolate Bayou's and Sand Supply's failures to timely file
contested-case hearing motions acted as a waiver of their rights to seek
administrative review, and affirmed the trial court's finding of lack of
jurisdiction to review the decision of the TQEC to issue the amended
Allens Creek permit.
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Chocolate Bayou and Sand Supply also challenged the legislation
requiring the TQEC to reissue the original Aliens Greek permit as an
unconstitutional "local law." The court held this challenge untimely
because such a challenge must occur prior to a final agency action.
Sean R. Biddle

City of Marshall v. City of Uncertain, 124 S.W.3d 690 (Tex. Ct. App.
Oct. 16, 2003) (holding statutory notice and hearing requirements did
not apply to municipality's request to amend its water permit to allow
an interbasin transfer, but that the same requirements did apply to the
municipality's request to amend its purpose of use; holding the
executive director of the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
could not issue the permit as amended).
The City of Uncertain, along with other concerned organizations
and individuals ("Uncertain"), appealed a Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality ("TCEQ") order that had amended the City of
Marshall's ("Marshall") water right permit. The District Court of
Travis County, 5 3'd Judicial District reversed TCEQ's order and
remanded the issue to TCEQ. TCEQ and Marshall appealed the
district court's decision. The Court of Appeals of Texas, Third
District, Austin heard the case on appeal.
In 1947, Marshall obtained a water permit to divert water from
Cypress Creek. In 1986, Marshall sought and received authorization
from the Texas Water Commission to divert 16,000 acre-feet ("af") of
water from Cypress Creek for municipal purposes. Marshall used its
water to provide water service to customers in the Cypress Creek Basin.
In 2001, Marshall applied to TCEQ for recognition of its historical
practice of providing water to customers in the Sabine River Basin in
addition to customers in the Cypress Creek Basin.
Marshall's
application also requested a change in authorized use, from municipal
use only to both municipal and industrial uses.
TCEQ determined that Marshall's amendment did not fall under
statutory notice and hearing requirements. Under the Texas Water
Code, inter-basin transfer applications where the proposed transfer is
from one basin to a municipality within that basin for use in the
municipality's service area outside the basin are not subject to the
statutory provisions concerning public notice and hearings. TCEQ
also determined that amending Marshall's authorized use from
municipal to both municipal and industrial would not create greater
adverse impacts than the existing permit on either the environment or
other water right holders. Following its two determinations, TCEQ
granted Marshall's request for an amended permit.
Uncertain filed a motion for TCEQ to overturn its decision and a
motion for a public hearing. When TCEQ denied the motions,
Uncertain filed suit in the district court. The district court granted

